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Hollow Hegemony: Theorising the Shift from Interest-Based to 





Today, attempts to explain the post-Cold War shift away from interest-based to 
value-based policy-making are increasingly caught in a cleft stick between Post-
Realist (e.g. neo-Gramscian and post-structuralist) revelations of hegemonic 
power relations and Post-Liberal (essentially Constructivist) assertions of the 
transformative power of ideas, communicative networks and emerging 
international norms. This paper suggests that neither Post-Realist nor Post-Liberal 
approaches are able to tell us much about the interrelationship between interests 
and ideas in the current historical conjuncture. This is because neither framework 
can easily countenance a disjunction between material ‘interests’ and the 
discursive forms in which power is projected internationally. Using the ontological 
focus and epistemological framework adopted in Karl Marx’s study of the crisis of 
political subjectivity, and the consequential retreat into idealism, of the German 
Ideology, this paper argues that a materialist grounding of ethical declarations of 
value-based policy does not necessarily lead back to the direct, or even indirect, 
interests of hegemonic powers. Rather, it indicates an era of ‘hollow hegemony’ 
marked by the lack of instrumental policy-making and the inability to construct a 





On 1 August 2006, UK prime minister Tony Blair made a major speech on foreign 
policy to the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles2 in which he declared that, 
looking back, the West’s response, in launching the ‘war on terror’, had been a 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Vanessa Pupavac and Christopher J. Bickerton for their suggestions 
and critique in the preparation of this paper. 
2 Tony Blair, ‘Future Foreign Policy’, speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, 1 August 




momentous one; one that was not fully recognised at the time: ‘The reason I say our 
response was even more momentous than it seemed at the time, is this. We could have 
chosen security as the battleground. We didn’t. We chose values.’3 For Blair, it was 
values that shaped the overthrow of the Afghan and Iraqi regimes: ‘The point about 
these interventions, however, military and otherwise, is that they were not just about 
changing regimes but changing the value systems governing the nations concerned. 
The banner was not actually “regime change” it was “values change”.’4 The ‘war on 
terror’, which has shaped many people’s understanding of international relations in 
the present decade, is seen by Blair to be more a battle over values than territory or 
geopolitical influence. 
 
While Blair puts a positive gloss on the ‘value-based’ approach to the war on terror, 
many other commentators have stressed the negative aspects of the US’s ‘ideological’ 
approach to international affairs. The 2003 war and consequent occupation of Iraq has 
been increasingly condemned for its neglect of interest-based policy-making and for 
the White House’s alleged ‘ideological’ refusal to plan ahead or to consider facts on 
the ground which challenged their idealised view of events.5 Despite the problems of 
Iraq, the ‘value-based’ approach to international affairs, proffered as much by Tony 
Blair as the Bush administration, has appealed across the political spectrum. The 
themes were taken up by liberal internationalists in Britain with the Westminster 
launch of the Henry Jackson Society, with cross-party support, in November 2005, 
and the formation of the democratic progressive alliance under the rubric of the 
Euston Manifesto in March 2006.6 The transatlantic appeal of the neoconservative 
ideologues in the Bush administration can be clearly seen in The Times columnist 
Oliver Kamm’s book, Anti-Totalitarianism: The Left-Wing Case for a 
Neoconservative Foreign Policy.7 
 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 3. 
4 Ibid., 2; see also Blair, ‘A Battle for Global Values’, Foreign Affairs 86, no.1 (2007): 79–90. 
5 See, for example, George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar Straus 
Giroux, 2005) and Larry J. Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled 
Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2005). 
6 The website of the Henry Jackson Society can be found at: http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org.uk/ 
and that of the Euston Manifesto at: http://eustonmanifesto.org/joomla/. 
7 Oliver Kamm, Anti-Totalitarianism: The Left-Wing Case for a Neoconservative Foreign Policy 




In many ways, the emphasis on values, vis-à-vis interests, has been the dominant 
theme of international relations since the end of the Cold War. The decade of the 
1990s was shaped by the experiences of intervention and non-intervention in relation 
to human rights abuses, closing with the Kosovo War in 1999, which Blair famously 
described in similar terms as a war fought ‘not for territory but for values’.8 It would 
seem that the Cold War world of realpolitik, in which interests of state security were 
considered primary, has been transformed into the post-Cold War world of value-
based policy-making in which security has been redefined in terms which see the 
security of regions of the world as interdependent, rather than conflictual, and the 
issues of concern extended away from external threats in the military sphere to 
internal questions of democracy, good governance and relief from poverty.9 
 
During the Cold War, only small, relatively wealthy, Western states which lacked a 
large independent military capacity and had few interests at stake overseas, such as 
the Scandinavian states, took an ethical or values-based approach to international 
affairs, which presumed that there was little distinction between domestic and 
international political perspectives. Today, it appears that what was once a marginal 
position is now mainstream, with major Western military powers, projecting their 
power in apparently disinterested value- or norm-based terms as if they were merely 
‘nuclear Norways’. This approach is probably best captured by Robert Cooper, former 
adviser to UK prime minister Tony Blair and currently policy adviser to Javier 
Solana, the European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. He vociferously argues that leading European states have a post-national or 
postmodern approach to foreign policy, one that makes no distinction between 
domestic and international concerns: 
 
Lying behind the postmodern international order is the postmodern state … state 
interest becomes less of a determining factor in foreign policy … The postmodern 
state is the opposite [of the statist projects of Communism and Fascism]. The 
                                                 
8 Tony Blair, ‘A New Generation Draws the Line’, Newsweek, 19 April 1999. 
9 See, for example, the regular UN reports, such as: A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 
Report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (New York: 
United Nations, 2004), available at: http://www.un.org/secureworld/; In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General (New York: United 




individual has won and foreign policy is the continuation of domestic concerns 
beyond national boundaries and not vice versa.10 
 
Here, power is no longer projected as an act of interest-based hegemony but as an 
ethical or value-based act. This view of the disinterested projection of military and 
diplomatic power is reflected in the Barcelona Report, A Human Security Doctrine for 
Europe, commissioned by Solana, which argues that: ‘A Human Security approach 
for the European Union means that it should contribute to the protection of every 
individual human being and not focus only on the Union’s borders, as was the 
security approach of nation-states’.11 Power has consistently been projected in terms 
of values, rather than interests, by the European Union and debate over Europe as a 
‘normative power’ has been ongoing over the current decade.12 
 
This paper seeks to elucidate briefly the impact of the shift from interests to values on 
theorising the international, highlighting the reaction against the interest-led 
methodological approach of Realism, and shift to approaches within the 
Constructivist framework. It suggests that, although providing a useful description 
and exploration of the new policy discourses, Constructivist approaches have been of 
limited use in explaining the reasons for this shift. This is because their ‘anti-
foundational’ approach has consciously avoided the need to ground the shift to values 
historically and materially.13 In highlighting the one-sidedness of both the current 
Post-Realist14 and the Post-Liberal,15 Constructivist, approaches the paper suggests 
                                                 
10 Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London: 
Atlantic Books, 2003), 50–3. 
11 A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s 
Security Capabilities, presented at Barcelona, 15 September 2004, 9. Available at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityDoctrine.pdf. 
12 For a summary, see Ian Manners, ‘European Union, Normative Power and Ethical Foreign Policy’, 
in Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy: Pitfalls, Possibilities and Paradoxes, ed. David Chandler and 
Volker Heins (London: Routledge, 2007), 116–36. 
13 Steve Smith, ‘Reflectivist and Constructivist Approaches to International Relations’, in The 
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis and Steve 
Smith (2nd edn) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 227. 
14 I use the term ‘Post-Realist’ to group together a variety of critical approaches that seek to assert the 
importance of power relations for understanding the discursive forms in which international policy-
making is expressed. These approaches tend to see values as serving the interests of power, whereas 
traditional Realist theorists have a much more ambiguous approach, tending to see an emphasis on 
values or ethics as problematic and potentially undermining national self-interest. See further, Heins 
and Chandler, ‘Ethics and Foreign Policy: New Perspectives on an Old Problem’, in Rethinking Ethical 




that a useful way forward for theorising the international today could be to reconsider 
the relevance, in terms of both ontological focus and epistemological framework, of 
Karl Marx’s study of the crisis of political subjectivity and the consequential retreat 
into idealism of the German bourgeoisie in early nineteenth-century Germany. The 
concluding sections draw out the importance of this approach for materially 
reconnecting the relationship between interests and values, but in a much more 
mediated way than that offered by either Post-Realist or Constructivist approaches. 
 
 
What’s at Stake for Theorising the International? 
 
IR, the Cold War Discipline 
 
IR was very much a Cold War discipline, founded on the creation of a ‘world of 
states’, not just with the end of empire and the decolonisation process - termed the 
‘empire of civil society’ in Justin Rosenberg’s critique of Realist theory16 - but also 
the integration of the Soviet Union into the international system.17 The precondition 
of the abstract structuralist framework of neo-Realism was the creation of an 
‘anarchical society’, a set of shared norms of diplomatic and international political 
protocol, symbolised by the UN Security Council’s inclusion of the Soviet Union and 
later of China. Ironically, the structure of anarchy appeared to be the determining 
factor precisely because there was not an anarchy but an integrated international 
system; symbolically captured in the ‘super-power summits’ between the US and the 
Soviet Union and, after the Korean War, the permanent presence of the Soviet Union 
at the Security Council. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
15 I use the term ‘Post-Liberal’ to describe approaches, such as Constructivism, which no longer view 
state action within the rationalist framework of liberal institutionalism and regime theory. For Wendt, 
the importance of Constructivism was that it freed the study of state interaction from the structuralist, 
neoliberal, focus on fixed identities in the form of national interests (Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is 
What States Make of It’, International Organization 46, no.2 (1992): 394–419; 393; 417; see also the 
Introductions to the various editions of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence 
(3rd edn) (New York: Longman, 2001). 
16 Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International 
Relations (London: Verso, 1994). 





Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 book Theory of International Politics, which established the 
theoretical grounding of neo-Realism, made an impact because its simplicity seemed 
to capture what was relevant to the international sphere: interests that were 
exogenously determined by the structure of the system itself. Values or ideas seemed 
to be of little importance in their own right as, regardless of the internal domestic 
politics of state actors (whether they were communist or capitalist) all states appeared 
to act similarly in the international sphere: 
 
In defining international-political structures we take states with whatever 
traditions, habits, objectives, desires, and forms of government they may have. We 
do not ask whether states are revolutionary or legitimate, authoritarian or 
democratic, ideological or pragmatic. We abstract from every attribute of states 
except their capabilities.18 
 
National governments had clear conceptions of policy-ends which framed, and 
limited, policy discussions and in the context of the Cold War divide the IR vision of 
states as self-interested rational instrumental actors seemed to be well grounded. The 
task of the theorist of the international sphere was to understand the interests of states 
- in securing themselves through forms of self-help, particularly by maintaining, or 
responding to shifts in, the balance of power - and thereby seek to ameliorate conflict. 
 
Prior to Waltz’s 1979 masterwork, the Classical Realist and English School 
perspectives also took a view that it was the understanding of state interests that was 
the key to stabilising world order and avoiding conflict. The critique of ‘utopianism’ 
or ‘idealism’ in the interwar period took the form of a stark materialist analysis in the 
work of E. H. Carr, who held that: ‘Theories of international morality are … the 
product of dominant nations or groups of nations.’19 The founder of Realism as a US 
academic discipline, Hans Morgenthau, focused on ‘power politics’, taking a 
cautionary approach to the pursuit of values and ideas in isolation from an 
understanding of the operation of state interests, drawing on a number of historical 
                                                 
18 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 99; see 
also Waltz, Man the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, 2nd rev. edn (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2001). 
19 Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 




examples to argue ‘the practical impossibility of founding a successful foreign policy 
upon ideological affinities rather than upon a community of political interests’.20 
Hedley Bull, the most developed theorist in the English School, similarly took a 
highly materialist approach, summarily dismissing the constitutive ideas of Richard 
Falk, for theorising a more cosmopolitan world order, as a dangerous ‘confusion of 
description and prescription’.21 
 
 
The Challenge to IR 
 
The narrow focus on the structure of anarchy and the pursuit of self-interests of 
Realism was widely challenged, as an explanatory framework, in the wake of the 
events of 1989 and the end of the Cold War. As Christian Reus-Smit noted: ‘the end 
of the Cold War undermined the explanatory pretensions of Neo-Realists and 
Neoliberals, neither of which had predicted, nor could adequately comprehend, the 
systematic transformations reshaping the global order’.22 Jack Donnelly, for example, 
argues in his comprehensive study of Realist approaches: 
 
Neo-Realism … cannot comprehend change. During the Cold War, this theoretical 
gap seemed acceptable to many. But when the Cold War order collapsed seemingly 
overnight, even many otherwise sympathetic observers began to look elsewhere – 
especially because the collapse was intimately tied to ideas … and processes … 
that were excluded by Neo-Realist structuralism.23 
 
There was a shift in values and ideas, initially in the Soviet Union, with the implosion 
of the ruling bureaucracy, and with repercussions in the discrediting of traditional 
Left/Socialist state-based projects of change and, more slowly, the crisis of traditional 
Conservative/Christian Democratic approaches framed in opposition to Communism. 
                                                 
20 Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1946), 58; see also Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, ed. rev. 
K. W. Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 224–49. 
21 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 1995), 266. 
22 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Constructivism’, in Theories of International Relations, ed. Scott Burchill et 
al., 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 216. 





It was little surprise that the shift in values, ideas and identities internationally led to 
an increasing interest in Constructivist approaches, which challenged the Realist view 
that interests were the determining factor in understanding the international sphere.24 
 
Where Realists saw values as being a product of interests (consciously or 
unconsciously), Constructivists saw self-perceptions of interests as products of 
changing, intersubjectively constructed norms and values. Interests became secondary 
concerns and lost the causal agency associated with the Realist framework in which 
states were rationalist self-determining actors. Constructivism posed a challenge to 
Realism, but in the early 1990s the Constructivist framework was still squeezed into 
the ontological concerns of Realist theory – state interaction – for example Alexander 
Wendt’s focus on state interaction is central to his thesis that ‘anarchy is what states 
make of it’.25 Inevitably, however, the focus on values rather than interests tended to 
undermine the specificity of the international once values were dissociated from 
geopolitical, territorial, understandings of the world.26 Where Rationalist approaches 
were based on the assumption that states pursued (relatively fixed) national interests, 
Constructivist theorists argued that national interests should be seen as flexible and 
indeterminate. Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink write: 
 
Actors’ interests and preferences are not given outside social interaction or 
deduced from structural constraints in the international or domestic environment. 
Social constructivism does not take the interests of actors for granted, but 
problematizes and relates them to the identities of actors.27 
 
                                                 
24 As Alexander Wendt stated, inversing the rationalist framework: ‘Identities are the basis of interests’, 
in Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’, 398. 
25 Ibid.; see also Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
26 See, for example, Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996). 
27 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into 
Domestic Practices: Introduction’, in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change, ed. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University 




As Risse and Sikkink note, ‘This new emphasis has resulted from the empirical failure 
of approaches emphasizing material structures as the primary determinants of state 
identities, interests and preferences.’28 They continue: 
 
We do not mean to ignore material conditions. Rather, the causal relationship 
between material and ideational factors is at stake. While materialist theories 
emphasize economic or military conditions or interests as determining the impact 
of ideas in international and domestic politics, social constructivists emphasize that 
ideas and communicative processes define in the first place which material factors 
are perceived as relevant and how they influence understandings of interests, 
preferences, and political decisions.29 
 
In an apparently fluid context of post-Cold War change, identities and interests were 
no longer seen to be constrained by structural material conditions; ideas, identities and 
their expression and communication become the focus of study. In this case, the 
strategic interest-based interaction of states was no longer crucial for understanding 
policy developments in the international sphere. This is well captured in the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s Responsibility to 
Protect report, which suggests that rationalist approaches dissimulate international 
policy possibilities, whereas value-based understandings clarify them: 
 
The notion of responsibility itself entails fundamental moral reasoning and 
challenges deterministic theories of human behaviour and international relations 
theory. The behaviour of states is not predetermined by systemic or structural 
factors, and moral justifications are not merely after-the-fact justifications or 
simply irrelevant.30 
 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 6. 
29 Ibid., 6–7. 
30 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect: 
Research, Bibliography, Background (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 
129. See also, Wendt, ‘On Constitution and Causation in International Relations’, in The Eighty Years’ 
Crisis 1919–1999, ed. Tim Dunne, Michael Cox and Ken Booth (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998); Theo Farrell, ‘Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program’, 




For example, if ideas were more important than military or political power then moral 
agencies and actors, such as international NGOs or ‘global civil society’, would be 
able to have a major influence merely through ‘the power of persuasion’.31 Once the 
focus was no longer on securing state interests, as traditionally understood, then 
interest-based politics – an instrumentalist understanding of policy-making – could no 
longer serve to explain international actions. 
 
The rejection of instrumentalist understandings of the international sphere, which 
necessarily follows from removing the ontological centrality of political interests, 
makes any deeper, contextual or structural explanation of current trends problematic. 
Ideas and values necessarily become increasingly dealt with on their own terms and 
ascribed the agency which was previously associated with interest-bearing state 
actors. However, the shift from interests to values as the explanatory factor in 
international developments necessarily elides the concept of power, previously at the 
centre of Realist theorising. This paper suggests that for theorists of the international 
sphere to follow the ideas – the declarations of government spokesmen and policy 
think-tanks - rather than political interaction is problematic. This would be to renege 
on the task of critique: the attempt to explain and understand events, rather than just 
reflect the views of participants. In this regard, one of the most important issues in 
need of critical analysis would appear to be precisely that of the post-Cold War shift 





As Zaki Laïdi has pointed out, the Cold War era appeared to be one of a clear clash of 
interests, not because interests were self-obviously pre-given but because the 
understanding of interests was intimately tied up with values: the ideological struggle 
between Left and Right.32 The Cold War intimately tied values with the territorial 
                                                 
31 William Korey, ‘Human Rights NGOs: The Power of Persuasion’, Ethics and International Affairs 
13 (1999): 151–74; see also Susan D. Burgerman, ‘Mobilizing Principles: The Role of Transnational 
Activists in Promoting Human Rights Principles’, Human Rights Quarterly 20 (1998): 905–23. 
32 He states that: ‘Indeed, it managed to combine two absolutes: meaning, symbolized by the 
ideological combat between two universal and competing value-systems; and power, carried by the 
absolute weapon, the nuclear bomb.’ Zaki Laïdi, A World without Meaning: The Crisis of Meaning in 




division of the world into states: it was a geopolitical divide, a division that was at 
once both ideological and territorial. Rather than values being a secondary product of 
interests, it is possible to look back on the Cold War era as one where values and 
interests were codeterminate with each other. In fact, it is clear that there can be no 
interests without values, without conscious political decisions as to what the ends and 
aspirations of government and society are. As Constructivists are right to suggest, 
without a clear sense of self-identity and clear values, it is not possible to have clear 
strategic interests. 
 
The lack of interests and rejection of instrumentality in policy-making in the post-
Cold War era seems to reflect an uncertainty of values codeterminate with an 
uncertainty over what interests or goals should be pursued in the international 
sphere.33 Despite offering some detailed descriptions of policy changes,34 
Constructivist theorists tend to counterpose values to interests, rather than seeing them 
as being intimately connected. Rather than problematising the shift from interest-
based to value-based policy-making and inquiring into why Western policy-makers 
should be increasingly rejecting instrumental interest-based approaches, 
Constructivists have tended to accept this development uncritically. Tim Dunne, for 
example, views Cold War instrumentality as flawed, both conceptually and morally, 
precisely because it separated ends and means. This, for Dunne, ‘implies a positivist 
view of knowledge in which “reality” is produced by a set of identifiable antecedent 
conditions’.35 Dunne states that: 
 
Instrumentalist thinking not only runs a risk of treating contexts as though they are 
immutable, it runs the parallel moral problem of instrumentality. Locked in the 
                                                 
33 This uncertainty was well expressed by Condoleezza Rice’s statement that: ‘The United States has 
found it exceedingly difficult to define its “national interest” in the absence of Soviet power.’ See, 
Rice, ‘Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest’, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2000. Available at: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20000101faessay5/condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promoting-the-
national-interest.html.  
34 See, for example, Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in 
World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Christian Reus-Smit, American Power 
and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Michael Edwards and John 
Gaventa (eds), Global Citizen Action (London: Earthscan, 2001); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998); Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights. 
35 Tim Dunne, ‘“Fighting for Values”: Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine’, paper 





mind-set of a strategic game, it is too easy to treat individuals and communities as 
means and not ends.36 
 
For Constructivists, policy-making and theorising are constitutive acts rather than 
rationalist ones.37 Nicholas Wheeler and Alex Bellamy, for example, assert that 
Realism’s claim to objectivity is easily falsified because ‘it is the Realist mindset that 
has constructed the very practices that Realist theory seeks to explain’.38 In which 
case it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish the declaration from the deed, and 
subjective intentions and individual self-understandings become more important than 
seeking for any deeper social or contextual explanation.39 The focus on surface 
appearances inevitably leads to an uncritical understanding of the shift towards value-
based policy-making. In his critique of such approaches, Ronen Palan succinctly 
argues that: 
 
[Constructivism] effectively conflates a methodology with a theory … general 
theories of interactionist order cannot provide an explanation for the specificity of 
an order … Theirs is a phlegmatic society – a harmonious society based on laws 
and norms … [W]hy are there variations in social constructions?... When … 
constructivism … is used as a theory of international relations, it exorci[ses] any 
form of social critique from the narrative. It tells us that while Neo-Realists think 
that world politics are ‘mean and nasty’, in fact it is not.40 
 
The critical response to the constructivist challenge has sought to reassert the 
instrumentalist link between values and the interests of power. Left-leaning Post-
Realist theorists assert the power interests which lie behind the shifting discourses of 
the international: neo-Gramscians tend to focus on hegemonic ideologies and 
Foucauldian approaches focus on the role of values and norms in the mechanics of 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 6. 
37 See, for example, Thomas Diez, ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 
“Normative Power Europe’’’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33, no.3 (2005): 613–36. 
38 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy, 'Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics’, in The 
Globalization of World Politics, ed. Baylis and Smith, 90. 
39 Christopher J. Bickerton, unpublished paper, ‘Ideological Power Europe? The Social Origins of 
Europe’s Normative Power’. 
40 Ronen Palan, ‘A World of their Making: An Evaluation of the Constructivist Critique in 
International Relations’, Review of International Studies 26, no.4 (2000): 575–98; 592–3; see also 
Chandler, Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and Power in International Relations 




governmentality. These main ‘materialist’ alternatives to Constructivist theorising all 
see power relations as reproduced through dominant discourses which directly or 
indirectly coincide with the interests of ruling political elites. For neo-Gramscians and 
Foucauldians we need not look any further than power (either in terms of explanatory 
interests or disciplinary techniques and practices) to understand discourses of values 
and ideas as instrumental products of hegemonic forces. There is no contradiction 
between the ideological appearances and the instrumental workings of the hegemony 
of Western power: for Post-Realists, the focus on values can be seen as legitimising 
the broad regulatory sweep of the ‘war on terror’,41 for neo-Gramscians the ideology 
of liberal democracy and the market reinforces the hegemony of capital, particularly 
through ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’,42 and for neo-Foucauldians the ideological 
discourses of nationalism,43 the freedom of the market,44 or of ‘participatory poverty 
reduction’45 interpolate subjects willing to accept their own subjection.46 However, 
these approaches remain, with the Constructivists, at the level of appearances. Despite 
the alleged instrumentalism of hidden ‘interests’, it is the ideas, the ideological 
appearances that do the work of enforcing the hegemony of power. While, for 
Constructivists, the focus on values challenges hegemony, for Post-Realists value 
frameworks reinforce it. However, neither framework convincingly grounds the shift 
from interests to values. 
 
                                                 
41 For example, Tariq Ali, ‘Re-colonizing Iraq’, New Left Review no.21 (May–June 2003): 5–19. 
42 See, for example, Robert Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in 
Method’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12, no.2 (1983): 162–75; Cox, Production, 
Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1987); Stephen Gill, ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 24, no.3 (1995): 399–423; Gill, Power and Resistance in 
the New World Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003). 
43 David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis, 
Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). 
44 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books, 2001); Duffield, ‘Social 
Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development: Aid as a Relation of Global Liberal 
Governance’, in State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction, ed. Jennifer Milliken (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2003); Rita Abrahamsen, ‘The Power of Partnership in Global Governance’, Third World Quarterly 25, 
no.8 (2004): 1453–67. 
45 David Craig and Doug Porter, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A New Convergence’, World 
Development 31, no.1 (2003): 53–69. Draft available at: 
http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/decentralization/afrlib/craig.pdf; Alastair Fraser, ‘Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers: Now Who Calls the Shots?’, Review of African Political Economy no.104/5 
(2005): 317–40. 
46 Foucault himself often demonstrated a more problematising approach to the workings of power, 
distancing his position from his followers’ attempts to read his work as a ‘monotonous assertion of 
power’ and distinguishing disciplinary techniques from liberal governmentality. See the forthcoming 
publication, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977–78 (Basingstoke: 




An alternative way forward, suggested here, is to be found in the work of Karl Marx, 
not in his study of the struggle of collective class interests, to be found throughout his 
major works, or his work specifically on capitalist ideology and the alienation of 
labour, which is most fully articulated in the section on ‘commodity fetishism’ in 
Volume I of Das Kapital, but in his study of the disjuncture between interests and 
ideas, particularly with reference to Germany in the 1840s. This was a subject touched 
upon in much of his early work, for example, in the Deutsch-Französischer 
Jahrbücher (1844), Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 
(written 1843–4), The Holy Family (written 1844–5), and the German Ideology 
(written 1845–6). 
 
The German bourgeoisie are described by Marx, at the time, as lacking any clear 
consciousness of their collective interests. While the French and the British elites 
were transforming the world in their image at the end of the eighteenth and in the 
early nineteenth centuries, modernising their societies within and projecting their 
power into Europe and around the globe, the German bourgeoisie took refuge in the 
idealised theorising of philosophers such as Immanuel Kant. As Marx describes: 
 
Kant was satisfied with ‘good will’ alone, even if it remained entirely without 
result … Kant’s good will fully corresponds to the impotence, depression and 
wretchedness of the German burghers, whose petty interests were never capable of 
developing into the common, national interests of a class … These petty, local 
interests had as their counterpart, on the one hand, the truly local and provincial 
narrow-mindedness of the German burghers and, on the other hand, their 
cosmopolitan swollen-headedness.47 
 
Marx suggests that the focus on values, dislocated from the interests which gave rise 
to them, was a sign of the political incapacity and weakness of the German 
bourgeoisie. Where the more developed and cohered bourgeois classes in Britain, 
France and the United States were confident in the promotion of their collective 
national interests in the framework of universal values, in the early 1840s, the 
fragmented and weak German bourgeoisie could not project their interests in the form 
                                                 




of a collective future-orientated project except in an idealised form. As Marx stated in 
1842: 
 
We have to register a definite protest against this endless, nebulous and unclear 
ratiocination of those German liberals who think they honour liberty by relegating 
it to the starry heaven of imagination instead of basing it on the firm foundation of 
reality … [T]hese masters of imaginary ratiocination, … these masters of 
sentimental enthusiasm … are afraid lest their ideal be desecrated by its coming in 
touch with profane reality.48 
 
Here there was the language of liberalism, of democracy and freedom, but without the 
content of a forward-looking and economically and politically dynamic modernising 
political class. Rather than reflecting the confidence of a political elite determined to 
engage with and transform the world, the idealisation of liberal forms reflected the 
political incapacity of the German bourgeoisie, their inability to formulate a coherent 
political programme and their unwillingness to take the responsibility for moving 
beyond Germany’s feudal and aristocratic past: 
 
Kant, therefore, separated this theoretical expression from the interests which it 
expressed; he made the materially motivated determinations of the will of the 
French bourgeoisie into pure self-determinations of ‘free will’, of the will in and 
for itself, of the human will, and so converted it into purely ideological conceptual 
determinations and moral postulates. Hence the German petty bourgeoisie recoiled 
in horror from the practice of this energetic bourgeois liberalism as soon as this 
practice showed itself, both in the Reign of Terror and in shameless bourgeois 
profit-making.49 
 
The German bourgeoisie took up the banner of liberal modernity solipsistically, in an 
idealised form, as they were unable to forge their own expressions of collective 
political purpose. In this respect, ideological forms which once expressed clear 
material interests were accepted ‘merely as abstract ideas, principles valid in and for 
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themselves, pious wishes and phrases’.50 The problem, for Marx and those concerned 
with the potential bourgeois revolution in Germany at the time, was that ideas and 
values dissociated from a clear view of interests incapacitated rather than energised 
the German middle classes: ‘Their attitude, therefore, to these forms was far more 
moral and disinterested than that of other nations, i.e. they exhibited a highly peculiar 
narrow-mindedness and remained unsuccessful in all their endeavours.’51 As Marcuse 
noted, this flight into idealism was premised on a rejection of engagement in practical 
political problems; here there was ‘morality before practical justice, the inner life 
before the social life of man’.52 The consequence of a rejection of practical 
engagement, of the rejection of the responsibilities of political leadership, was a 
moralised and moralising outlook on international affairs: 
 
This idealistic culture, however, just because it stood aloof from an intolerable 
reality and thereby maintained itself intact and unsullied, served, despite its false 
consolations and glorifications, as the repository for truths which had not been 
realized in the history of mankind.53 
 
The focus on values rather than interests was, in the case of the German bourgeoisie, 
not a direct reflection of their interests but a reflection of their inability to collectively 
conceive of and act on their interests. This case suggests that ideological outlooks or 
moral beliefs can have a much more mediated relationship with lived experience than 
suggested by Realist theorists or by the neo-Gramscian focus on hegemonic 
ideologies or Foucauldian approaches to governmentality. More importantly, the 
flight to ethics and values is seen by Marx as a reflection of the weakness and 
incapacity of the political class in Germany, suggesting that there is much more room 
for political agency (and it was this that made Marx and Engels call for a much more 
radical stance in relation to the German political malaise, seeing the proletariat as the 
only class capable of emancipating German society54). 
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Similarly, Marx’s understanding of German idealism offers an alternative to 
Constructivist approaches, which see ideas as driving reconceptions of interests rather 
than focusing on real lived social relations. The German bourgeoisie’s idealism, their 
flight into abstract values was understood to be dislocated from their interests because 
of Marx’s study of the specific material conditions prevailing in Germany. For Marx, 
the key to unlocking the idealist self-consciousness of the German bourgeoisie could 
not be found in the ideas themselves but only in the social context in which they were 
generated. In a direct critique of idealist approaches, and one which could be equally 
applied to approaches within the Constructivist framework today, Marx states: 
 
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here 
we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men 
say, imagine, conceive … in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from 
real, active men, and on the basis of their real life processes we demonstrate the 
development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process … In the 
first method of approach the starting point is consciousness taken as the living 
individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life; it is the real living 
individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their 
consciousness.55 
 
Rather than study the ideological appearances - for example, the self-proclaimed 
rejections of narrowly conceived national interests and attention to global problems of 
humanity - to understand the change of interests of states or the transformation of the 
international system, Marx suggests studying the actors themselves. In the case of the 
German bourgeoisie, Marx concludes that it is their weakness and fragmentation, 
squeezed between the remnants of the ancien régime and the developing industrial 
proletariat, which explains their ideological flight into values. Rather than take on 
political responsibility for overthrowing the old order, the German bourgeoisie denied 
their specific interests and idealised progress in the otherworldly terms of abstract 
philosophy, recoiling from the consequences of their liberal aspirations in practice. 
 
 
                                                 




Power and Interests Today 
 
The malaise of the German political sphere in the first half of the nineteenth century 
was one which Marx, at the time, considered to be unique, noting that: 
 
German history prides itself on having travelled a road which no other nation in the 
whole of history has ever travelled before, or ever will again. We have shared the 
restorations of modern nations without having shared their revolutions.56 
 
The German bourgeoisie was caught in an international context where events seemed 
to happen beyond their control, the centre of politics having shifted with the French 
Revolution and English industrialisation. The bourgeoisie seemed powerless in the 
face of broader global forces and its inability to cohere society around a political 
programme domestically. In this context, its inability to formulate or pursue a political 
programme based on its own interests, or to project this in universal terms, was seen 
as an aberration by Marx and Engels, where there was a generalised crisis of political 
subjectivity. Neither the ancien régime, nor the bourgeoisie and the proletariat were 
strong enough politically to stamp their authority on society: ‘all classes lack that 
breadth of spirit which identifies itself, if only for a moment, with the spirit of the 
people’.57 In this political malaise no section of society was able to articulate an ‘idea 
of the state’ clearly: to generalise the interests of society in terms of the national 
interest.58 
 
It is suggested here that Marx’s acute analysis of the crisis of political subjectivity in 
relation to German idealism is of more than merely historical interest. In the very 
different context of today’s post-political world, similar questions of the governing 
elite’s capacity to cohere and project political authority are raised. The exercise of 
power increasingly appears to be vitiated by political incapacity, both domestically 
and internationally. Western elites seem to be increasingly isolated from their own 
societies and unable to develop or cohere forward-looking political programmes in the 
aftermath of the end of the ideological conflict of the Cold War. 
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Rather than focus on the ethical rhetoric of world leaders, or the reflection of this 
idealism in many of the Normative and Constructivist commentaries in international 
relations, it is the real experiences of Western elites which give content to their 
idealist reflections. Rather than a Foucauldian, Realist or neo-Gramscian focus on the 
capacities of Western elites to further their interests under the banner of ethics, it 
seems that it is the incapacities of these elites that provide the specific content for 
twenty-first-century ethical or values-based agendas. This is captured well in the work 
of Alain Badiou, who argues: 
 
Whether we think of it as the consensual representation of Evil or as concern for 
the other, ethics designates above all the incapacity, so typical of the contemporary 
world, to name and strive for a Good … [T]he ‘concern for the other’ signifies that 
it is not a matter – that it is never a matter – of prescribing hitherto unexplored 
possibilities for our situation, and ultimately for ourselves. The law (human rights, 
etc.) is always already there.59 
 
The ethical agenda, for Badiou, is a conservative one, which cannot see beyond the 
status quo. He suggests that the key to understanding the rise of ethical or values-
based projections of power in the West is the incapacity of ruling elites to formulate a 
collective project and the retreat from political responsibility for taking society 
forward. In fact, the rise of ethics, the stated rejection of self-interest in exchange for 
‘global concerns’ or the ‘good of the other’, marks the inability of the political class to 
act as such: ‘For from the beginning it confirms the absence of any project, of any 
emancipatory politics, or any genuinely collective cause.’60 The hollow nature of the 
domestic political process, where a narrow bureaucratic mentality reduces politics to 
administration61 is matched by an idealism, projected mainly into the international 
sphere, both being two sides of the same coin which no longer perceives of political 
interests and therefore seeks to remove politics from the earthly realm of a struggle 
over interests into an idealised realm of the struggle over ‘values’. 
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The themes articulated so sharply by Badiou, were first raised by another French 
theorist, Zaki Laïdi, in his seminal book A World without Meaning.62 Laïdi argued 
that the post-Cold War era has been marked by ‘the gap between power and 
meaning’, i.e. that political subjectivity, the capacity of Western political leadership, 
has been fundamentally undermined with the end of the geopolitical divide of the 
Cold War. Without a forward-looking political project the projection of power in the 
international sphere lacks any ends-based meaning or purpose. Instead it is the 
subjective intentions of state-actors which are prioritised above any broader strategic 
or long-term policy-making: 
 
There is no longer any distance between what one does and what one aspires to. 
This confusion is of great concern because it appears to give states authority to be 
free of political perspective … Thus our societies claim that the urgency of 
problems forbids them from reflecting on a project, while in fact it is their total 
absence of perspective that makes them slaves of emergencies.63 
 
Rather than justifying policy in terms of practical ends – the traditional interest-based 
understandings of the past – policy is increasingly justified in moral or value-based 
terms, giving legitimacy to the actions in and of themselves. Here we have the 
transition from interests to values, grounded in an understanding of Western political 
elites’ own crisis of subjectivity, of political purpose. Power is still projected 
internationally (and enforced domestically) but it is power which increasingly lacks a 
clear purpose and therefore seeks to engage idealistically rather than practically with 
the world. 
 
For Laïdi, the flight into idealism is the flip-side of this strategy of avoidance of 
political responsibility. The key point is that, in today’s social and political context, 
power, or at least the bearing of the responsibilities of power, is transformed from an 
asset into an embarrassment or a risk: 
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Power – understood in its widest sense – is conceived and experienced less and 
less as a process of taking over responsibilities, and more as a game of avoidance 
… Social actors avoid taking on their own responsibilities or some responsibilities 
because, in the absence of a project of meaning, responsibilities are measured only 
in cost terms.64 
 
Without a cause, a sense of purpose or political meaning it is difficult to engage in the 
making of policy. Policy cannot be formulated without a future-orientated vision of 
society, to which the government is committed. As Paul Williams argues: ‘In short, 
policy puts an emphasis on discerning what a desirable world would look like and 
how it may be brought about through conscious action.’65 This is because policy-
making entails taking responsibility for making choices dependent upon having a 
conviction in a political goal. It is only a strong conviction in the political ends of a 
policy that enables governments and societies to justify and legitimise the inevitable 
costs (whether in terms of money, soldiers/civilian lives, or other resources) of 
achieving these policy-ends. 
 
Today, Western political elites lack a strong political vision and therefore have a 
transformed perception of and relationship to political power. Governments and 
policy-makers are much more likely to experience their policy-making power as a 
‘risk’ or a cause of potential embarrassment than as an opportunity. They often seek 
to reject, rather than welcome, the responsibilities of power. Rather than claiming the 
rights of power, many governments seem to be happier when they are disclaiming 
them, seeking to devolve policy-making responsibilities either to regional and local 
authorities or to higher bodies such as the European Union or international 
institutions. There is a crisis of political legitimacy at the level of the nation-state 
which is at the heart of the shift away from the projection of power in the framework 
of national interests. This is not so much because political elites have taken up new 
ideas, and thereby understand their interests as ‘global concerns’ rather than national 
ones, as much as the lack of an organising collective ideology. 
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As Barry Buzan argues, the creation and projection of state interests is not possible 
without ‘a distinctive idea of some sort which lies at the heart of the state’s political 
identity’.66 As Buzan suggests there is an intimate link between the domestic capacity 
of the political elite to generate and express a forward-looking project and the ability 
of a state to project its power in the international sphere, in terms of self-interest or 
national interest. It seems to be this lack of perceived legitimacy that drives 
government policy-making, rather the confidence of a popular mandate.67 The desire 
to formulate policy without taking responsibility for the outcomes has engendered a 
shift of focus to the international sphere where the relationship between policy aims 
and results is a much more mediated one. However, the shift in focus to the 
international realm is a product of governmental weakness and disconnection from 
society, rather than a sign of having a clear sense of a collective or ‘national’ interest 
or purpose to project.68 
 
What is projected internationally is not a clear set of interests but a set of idealised 
aspirations. This makes both the formulation of policy and any strategic or long-term 
coherence problematic and results in both the development of policy and its 
implementation taking an irrational and ad hoc character. This is expressed in the 
contradictory process where political elites are keen to express the rhetoric of high 
moral responsibility in the international sphere but are reluctant to take responsibility 
for either policy-making or policy outcomes. This is reflected in four trends. There is 
space here to mention three of them only briefly in order to dwell slightly longer on 
the fourth. First there is the desire to act collectively, rather than unilaterally, to evade 
policy responsibility; this is seen most clearly in attempts to talk-up the importance of 
‘global’ problems and pass organisational responsibility to the UN or other 
transnational actors. Secondly there is the tendency for government leaders, think-
tanks and policy pundits to focus on problems beyond the capacity of the particular 
institution, government or agency; in this regard, rhetoric comes cheaply and blame 
can easily be passed to more powerful or resourceful actors, such as the US or the 
UN. Thirdly there is an increased tendency to pass responsibility on to those with 
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least influence, seen clearly in World Bank and IMF claims of ‘country ownership’ 
and in the focus on state capacity-building, where increased external intervention is 
repackaged as strengthening the ‘sovereignty’ of non-Western states.69 
 
Of more interest here is the fourth trend, already touched upon above: the separation 
of ends and means. We increasingly see Western diplomatic and military 
interventions presented as justified on the basis of value-based declarations, rather 
than in traditional terms of interest-based outcomes. This was as apparent in the wars 
of humanitarian intervention, in Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo - where there was no 
clarity of objectives and therefore little possibility of strategic planning in terms of the 
military intervention or the post-conflict political outcomes – as it is in the war on 
terror campaigns, still ongoing, in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Laïdi explains: 
 
[W]ar is not waged necessarily to achieve predefined objectives, and it is in 
waging war that the motivation needed to continue it is found. In these cases – of 
which there are very many – war is no longer a continuation of politics by other 
means, as in Clausewitz’s classic model – but sometimes the initial expression of 
forms of activity or organization in search of meaning … War becomes not the 
ultimate means to achieve an objective, but the most ‘efficient’ way of finding 
one.70 
 
In this sense, the ‘wars of choice’, alleged to be fought for values not traditional 
national interests - humanitarian intervention in the 1990s and the wars of ‘regime 
change’ under the rubric of the ‘war on terror’ in the present decade - were essentially 
wars which expressed both the lack of interests and the lack of values. They were 
fought under the banner of abstract values and vacuous moral claims not because they 
were a projection of interests, but because Western elites found it difficult to develop 
or project a political programme with positive goals. In other words, Western 
governments lacked both interests and clear values. In fact, it would appear that 
whereas the Cold War era marked the confluence of clear values and distinct interests, 
reflected in instrumental policy-making, the post-Cold War period has seen the 
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International policy-making in the post-Cold War era would therefore seem to be an 
idealised projection of the Western self, rather than the instrumental projection of 
strategic interests. Power is being projected internationally, but this is the production 
of ‘hollow hegemony’. Western hegemony is increasingly a hollow one, lacking the 
content and purpose reflected in and reproduced through a cohering framework of 
values and interests. The implications of these idealised reflections of elite incapacity, 
at the root of moralised visions of the international sphere, cannot be captured unless 
a theoretical framework is developed which goes beyond the value-based discourses 
of policy actors, grounding an understanding in the materiality of the real lived 
experiences of policy elites. What this reveals is that, counter-intuitively perhaps, 
international politics is becoming less ‘global’ and, in fact, more inward-looking and 
solipsistic.71 The retreat to ethical or value-based forms of legitimising policy is a 
reflection of the rejection of long-term strategic policy-making and the desire to 
disavow political responsibility when interventions are made.72 
 
The shift from interests to values reflects governing elites’ highly limited perception 
of their capacity to engage instrumentally in the outside world. It is this lack of 
capacity which explains why Western elites seem to be more interested in policy 
declarations of intent than practical outcomes. This is borne out in the rejection of 
traditional instrumental forms of policy-making and policy judgements, with the act 
itself being judged on the basis of ‘good intentions’ rather than results.73 This is 
clearly reflected in the ‘war on terror’, where despite the Manichean language of good 
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and evil and the call for international collaboration, there seems to be no framework 
which can give policy-making a structure and purpose beyond declaratory statements. 
As the former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, famously commented, 
there are no metrics to measure success or failure in what is speculatively being called 
the ‘Long War’.74 Similarly, in the human security and development-security nexus 
policy discussions there is a notable lack of any coherent framework for policy-
planning or assessment.75 
 
Once we ‘ascend from earth to heaven’ in an attempt to ground the shift towards 
values in a material context, it becomes clear that the relationship between interests 
and ideas is a much more mediated one than that expressed in either the Realist or 
Post-Realist reading of values as an expression of hegemonic interests or the radical 
separation between interests and value-based policy-making made by Constructivists. 
We are witnessing neither the interest-based projection of hegemonic power nor the 
value-led challenge to hegemony and traditional forms of power. Rather, idealised 
policy discourses and practices reflect today’s ‘hollow hegemony’ - the hollowing-out 
of the traditional frameworks of meaning which reflected and structured Western 
power. 
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